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Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal
Intellectual Property Law
Christopher Buccafusco ♣
&
Jonathan S. Masur ♦
INTRODUCTION
The scope and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) laws are becoming
salient, for the first time, to a wide cohort of U.S. and international communities.
National and international legislation, including the Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA), 1 the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), 2 and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), 3 have generated protests online and in the streets by people
who are concerned about the expansion of IP rights. Common to each of these
proposals was an expansion in the use of criminal sanctions to deter IP
violations. 4 Many copyright owners and the associations that represent them
support criminal enforcement of IP, including the use of imprisonment, to combat
the threat of increased IP piracy on the internet and throughout a globalized
economy. Others, including a heterogeneous coalition of scholars, activists, and
internet based companies like Google and Wikipedia, fear that using criminal

♣

Assistant Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual
Property, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
♦
Deputy Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The authors wish to
thank Kathy Baker, Stefan Bechtold, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Harry First, Sarah Harding, Lital
Helman, Mark Lemley, Irina Manta, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pam Samuelson, David Schwartz,
and the attendees of the NYU Colloquium on Innovation Policy, the Max Planck-ETH Zurich
Conference on the Economics of IP and Antitrust, and the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop for
comments on a previous draft of this Article. The authors are also grateful for excellent research
assistance by Leah Eubanks, Matthew Schock, and Dayron Silverio.
1
Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(1)(B) (1st Sess. 2011).
2
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of
2011
(PROTECT IP), S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(B) (1st Sess. 2011).
3
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, at E-1, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 239, 243 (2011).
4
See Christophe Geiger, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and Criminal Enforcement of
Intellectual Property: What Consequences for the European Union?, in IP RIGHTS AT THE
CROSSROADS OF TRADE (J. Rosen ed., 2012); Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An
Alphabet Soup of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreement, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013).
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sanctions to protect IP will expand already overgrown rights and chill valuable
expressive and inventive behavior. 5
There is likely some truth in both of these positions. The internet and
global markets do make infringing IP easier and detection of infringement more
difficult. Accordingly, the deterrent effect of civil sanctions for IP violation may
be weakeningweakening. Enhanced criminal sanctions could, however, tilt the
balance between owners and users of IP too far towards owners, thereby limiting
the opportunities for creative and innovative developments in the future. They
might also impose unnecessary costs upon the convicted infringers themselves,
channeling resources toward incarceration rather than research and development.
In situations where proposed rules present both costs and benefits, economic
analysis of law can play an important role in policymaking. 6
This Article offers an economic analysis of the use of criminal liability in
two areas of IP: copyright law and patent law. 7 Our goal is to analyze the
relative costs and benefits of criminal sanctions for IP violations. Economic
analysis is particularly appropriate to this discussion for a number of reasons.
Copyright and patent law are widely recognized as resting on utilitarian
foundations of promoting social welfare by incentivizing investment in
informational goods. 8 They do this by providing exclusive rights to creators of IP
that allow them to charge prices for use that are above marginal cost. Yet IP’s
commitment to incentives to create must be balanced by the costs that those rights
have for others who want to use or further develop the works and inventions that
have been created. Economic analysis’s explicit focus on utilitarian welfare
calculus, which compares the costs and benefits of legal rules, can aid in striking
the correct balance.
5

Mike Masnick, An Updated Analysis: Why SOPA & PIPA Are A Bad Idea, Dangerous &
Unnecessary,
TECHDIRT
(Jan.
18,
2012,
7:32
AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120117/23002717445/updatedanalysiswhy-sopa-pipa-are-bad-idea-dangerous-unnecessary.shtml; Michael A. Carrier, The Proposed
New Copyright Crime of “Aiding and Abetting,” OUPBLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 2:30 PM),
http://blog.oup.com/2010/10/copyrightcrime/.
6
See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. CostBenefit Analysis, DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2013).
7
This Article does not discuss trademark law although criminal liability is used to combat
counterfeit goods. The principal reason we have excluded trademark law from this discussion is
that the underlying economic rationale for trademark protection—avoiding consumer confusion—
is different from the underlying economic rationale for copyright and patent law—solving a public
goods problem for informational goods.
8
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2005). But see ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2012)
(proposing a Lockean foundation for IP protection).
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An explicitly economic focus on criminal sanctions in IP—to the
exclusion of other normative methodologies—is important for an additional
reason. Many IP stakeholders and scholars have operated under the assumption
that there is an economic case for criminal IP sanctions. 9 Criminal sanctions for
IP infringement are thought to be justified by the possibility of deterring or
incapacitating would-be infringers. When criminal IP sanctions have been
criticized, the criticism has usually come from a normative position outside of
economics—moral rights, for instance. 10 The economic case for criminal
sanctions is usually treated as unassailable.
In this article, we mean to assail it. We do not believe that the case for
criminal sanctions in IP is nearly as strong as many have treated it. Indeed, we
will argue that criminal liability may be justified only in one small corner of IP
law, in response to one discrete type of infringement. We believe that our
analysis is particularly important because it undermines the economic case for
criminal sanctions at its very foundation. There is no need to engage in
complicated and frequently unresolvable debates about economic versus moral
norms if both modes of thought militate equally against criminal IP penalties.
Even without venturing into the deep waters of normative debate, we believe the
range of economically justifiable criminal IP sanctions is quite narrow.
Additionally, as we will explain below, our analysis in this article
generally accepts the assumptions of traditional law and economics about
intellectual property law. That is, we assume for purposes of this paper that IP is
necessary to solve the public goods problem in information, that it incentivizes
people to create, and that the government will do an appropriate job of balancing
the rights of creators with the rights of users. The assumptions have all been
subjected to withering critiques by scholars (including the authors of this article).
We believe, however, that it is important to keep these assumptions intact as an
initial matter. If the case for criminal IP sanctions is weak when the assumptions
are accepted, it will only be weaker once those assumptions have been relaxed.
According to our analysis, there is a limited and tentative case for the use
of criminal liability, including imprisonment and alternative sanctions, for only
some types of copyright infringement—and none at all for patent infringement.
9

See e.g. I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305,
315 (2002) (hereinafter Criminal Copyright).
10
Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright
Infringement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67 (2012); Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of
Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469 (2011);
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 167, 240
(2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on
Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003).
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Because of the large scale of some copyright violations and the difficulty of
detecting them, civil remedies with punitive damages will create insufficient
deterrence. In response, copyright owners will resort to self-help, using digital
rights management (DRM) technologies to prevent unauthorized copying. But
DRM tends to be overbroad and eliminate much socially valuable copying. Thus,
criminal sanctions could provide a way of deterring harmful copying while
keeping valuable copying free from the restrictions of DRM. Imprisoning a few
people whose behavior is inarguably harmful may free up opportunities for others
who are engaging in welfare-enhancing expression. As we explain, however, it is
difficult to predict whether criminal sanctions will have these intended effects.
The behaviors of various parties are difficult to anticipate and may not coincide
with the assumptions of economic analysis.
The situation in patent law is different. Patent violations tend to be easier
to detect than copyright violations. More importantly, unlike many copyright
infringers, typical patent infringers will have sufficient resources to be able to
satisfy judgments against them. This means that civil remedies should produce
adequate deterrence and there is little need for liberty deprivations associated with
criminal sanctions.
The Article is organized in three Parts. In Part I, we introduce the
standard economic analysis of criminal law. Part II applies this analysis to
copyright law. We first consider whether any case can be made for incorporating
criminal sanctions into copyright law. After determining that such a case exists,
we next discuss the appropriate scope of criminal copyright law. Part III applies
economic analysis to the possibility of criminal patent law. Our analysis suggests
that criminal liability is unnecessary to deter patent violations.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CRIMINAL LAW
In this Part we present an overview of the economic theories of intellectual
property and criminal punishment. Although the economic theory of IP may be
familiar to many readers, we offer a brief synopsis here in the interest of
completeness. We then explain why criminal laws, and sanctions such as
incarceration, are often necessary despite the availability of civil damages. And
we explain the economic rationale for the criminalization of property offenses
despite the lack of any obvious economic loss. These explanations are offered
with an eye towards intellectual property crimes, which will be the focus of the
succeeding Parts.
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A.

The Economics of Intellectual Property

We offer here a simple snapshot of the economics of intellectual property.
Much important work has been done on this subject, and we will not attempt to
summarize all of it. 11 For our purposes, a baseline understanding of the economic
theory surrounding IP law is sufficient.
Inventive ideas and creative works are public goods: once they have been
created, they can be shared (copied) among many individuals to the benefit of all
of them simultaneously. 12 In this respect, they are also nonrival goods: multiple
people can make use of an idea or a creative work without depriving one another
of the enjoyment and use of that work. 13 Two firms can sell DVD players that
use the same technology simultaneously, and multiple people can read War and
Peace simultaneously without interfering with one another. Because intellectual
and creative ideas are public goods, they are liable to be under-produced. The
first individual to think of an invention or a creative work bears all the costs of
creating, while others can copy the idea or the work and dissipate the creator’s
advantage. 14 The threat that the creator will bear all of the costs and only reap a
fraction of the benefits raises the possibility that creators might not think it worth
their time and resources to create in the first place.
Intellectual property rights exist in order to solve this public goods
problem and to encourage the production of innovative and creative goods. 15
Property rights in inventions and creative works allow their creators to capture all
of the rents from the creation of those goods. Without having to fear that their
profits will be dissipated, creators will have greater incentives to innovate in the
first place. 16 However, these property rights simultaneously allow their owners to
charge monopoly prices. This leads to deadweight losses as some consumers who
would consume the goods if they were priced competitively cannot afford the
11

See, e.g., Edmund Kitsch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 26771 (1977) (proposing a patent prospect theory); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (offering a New Institutional
Economics approach to patent law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8; Mark F. Grady, Patent Law
and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992) (proposing a rent dissipation theory of patent
law).
12
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“Ideas are public goods: they can be copied freely and used by anyone who
is aware of them without depriving others of their use.”).
13
See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV.
175, 240 (2011) (detailing the nonrival nature of intellectual property rights).
14
See Lemley, supra note 12, at 129-33 (laying out the standard justification for intellectual
property).
15
Id. at 132 (explaining how IP rights solve the public goods problem in ideas).
16
Id. at 133 (same).
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monopoly prices. Intellectual property is thus thought to trade off dynamic
efficiency—greater innovation and creativity—against static inefficiency, namely
deadweight losses. 17
Efficiently solving the public goods problem does not, however, mean that
creators and innovators should be given maximal rights in their contributions. In
addition to creating static inefficiencies, strong IP rights also prevent others from
making welfare enhancing uses of protected works and inventions. Others may
wish to create derivative works of a copyrighted play or new improvements of a
patented machine. These contributions are more expensive when the underlying
contribution is protected by an IP right that must be licensed. In addition, there is
a concern that some socially valuable behavior will not be generated at all
because the IP owner may refuse to license it. For example, owners of copyrights
may be unwilling to license parodies and critical reviews of their works.
For these reasons, the duration and scope of IP rights should be limited.
IP law’s goal is to balance the incentives provided to creators with the interests of
the public and of subsequent creators. The current generation of creators and
inventors should only be given enough rights in their contributions to ensure that
they can recapture sufficient profits to make creating them worthwhile. Giving
additional rights to these people produces inefficiencies both through deadweight
losses and by increasing the costs of creating and inventing in subsequent
generations.
One final point bears emphasis. Many scholars believe that intellectual
property rights do not encourage substantially greater invention or creativity, at
least in some contexts. 18 In addition, many believe that current IP laws are not
efficiently balanced, because they provide excessive incentives to the current
generation of creators at the expense of the public and subsequent creators. (We
count ourselves among this group to some extent.) However, adopting that view
here would render the inquiry we seek to undertake far too easy. If intellectual
property rights are not necessary to induce innovation or creativity, then there is
no economic justification for intellectual property rights and they should simply
be eliminated. 19 Or, in lieu of eliminating IP rights, there should be no remedy—
17

Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights to Innovation, 60 STAN. L. REV.
863, 867 (2007) (explaining that patents “involve[] a fundamental tradeoff between dynamic and
static efficiency: patents spur innovation but only at the cost” of higher prices for current
consumers).
18
See MARK A. LEMLEY & DAN L. BURK, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE
IT 137-45 (2009) (detailing the many industries in which patents may do more harm than good and
describing the few instances in which patent rights may be socially valuable).
19
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE
L.J. 1590 (2011) (explaining the economic value of patents and proposing when they should and
should not be granted).
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civil or criminal—for infringement. If creators and inventors are already getting
inappropriately strong rights in their works, enhancing their rights through greater
enforcement will only further tip the balance in their favor.
We do not mean to minimize these concerns—as noted, we agree with
them to some extent. Nonetheless, we think that it is important to take the basic
economic assumptions seriously as an initial matter. First, if economic analysis
does not support criminal sanctions in a world that behaves according to
economic theory, then we need not even bother analyzing those sanctions when
adherence to economic theory is relaxed. This, as we noted above, we believe to
be the case for criminal patent sanctions. Second, we and others may be wrong to
doubt the importance of intellectual property in inducing research, development,
and creativity. If that is the case, it will be necessary to consider what remedies
should be applied in the event of infringement. Accordingly, we will proceed as
if patent and copyright law play some role in incentivizing innovation (as they are
meant to) and Congress has properly balanced the interests of creators and the
public. On this account, IP infringement will harm both the IP owner and society
at large (which will lose some benefits from future creativity), though it is
difficult to know to what degree.
B.
The Economics of Criminal Law: Incarceration, Damages, and
Deterrence
The economic goal of any set of laws is to produce the greatest possible
benefits at the lowest possible cost—in other words, to generate the maximum
achievable net benefits. 20 Criminal and tort laws are of course directed at
deterring costly behavior, and so the “benefits” produced by these laws come in
the form of crimes and accidents that have been avoided. 21 The law’s objective is
to deter as much harm as possible while imposing the fewest costs. 22 From an
economic perspective, criminal law and punitive incarceration at first seem to
present puzzles. Prison time generates very substantial economic costs, costs that
are imposed upon the prisoner, his 23 friends and family, and the government that

20

A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983) (outlining a
utilitarian theory of law centered on the maximization of net benefits).
21
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-71(describing the theory of optimal
tort damages).
22
Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 762 (1998)
(“Utilitarianism, for example, encourages architects of punishment to get the most deterrence at
the lowest possible cost.”) .
23
Because the vast majority of incarcerated prisoners are male, we will employ the male pronoun
here though it is not standard convention.
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is charged with imprisoning him. 24 The principal economic objective of
punishment is deterrence, and tort law should be able to efficiently deter
misconduct through monetary sanctions alone. Moreover, while tort lawsuits
might involve significant transactions costs, the civil fines themselves are not
economic costs but rather transfer payments from one party to another that
involve little or no efficiency loss. 25 On this account, prison sentences would
seem unnecessarily wasteful. 26 The economic justification for criminal law lies
with the possibility that defendants will be insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof.
Consider a straightforward case of assault. An assault victim might suffer
damages in the tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical bills and
lost wages, not to mention pain and suffering. The perpetrator of an assault may
not have assets worth nearly that much, and thus it might be impossible to collect
the necessary measure of damages. (This is the reason that many states require
automobile drivers to have insurance—in order to guard against otherwise
judgment-proof defendants.) If the amount of damages is set at a figure that
exceeds the perpetrator’s ability to pay, there is no reason for him to avoid
committing the act. The judgment-proof defendant cannot be effectively deterred.
This problem is of course much more severe for more serious harms, such as
murder, and it is accentuated by the fact that not every harm is detected and
punished.
In order to achieve optimal deterrence, standard economic theory suggests
that the expected penalty imposed upon the defendant must be equivalent to the
defendant’s likely gain from the crime. 27 The expected penalty is the likelihood
24

See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039-44 (2009) (hereinafter Happiness and Punishment) (describing the
hedonic costs of incarceration).
25
See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1357, 1418 (2003) (“the payment is a transfer made to satisfy a demand, and thus is not an
economic loss”).
26
The contrast we draw in this article is between monetary penalties and incarceration. We realize
that this contrast does not map perfectly onto the line between criminal and civil penalties:
criminal fines are quite common, and non-punitive civil incarceration exists as well. In some
cases there will be important differences between civil tort damages and criminal fines. However,
the distinction between monetary penalties and incarceration is the most stark and important
contrast between criminal and civil law, and it is the one that matters most from an economic
perspective because the two types of penalties are experienced so differently by offenders.
Accordingly, we focus our attention upon this critical distinction while acknowledging the nuance
involved in both civil and criminal sanctions. Henceforth, when we refer to “criminal” penalties
we primarily mean incarceration, and when we refer to “civil” penalties we mean monetary
sanctions. In this Part we will also refer to some alternative criminal sanctions that might deter
infringement, as we did in Part II with respect to copyright.
27
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 181184 (1968).
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that a defendant will be detected, apprehended, and fined, multiplied by the
magnitude of the sanction that will be imposed. 28 Imagine that it is worth
$10,000 to a hypothetical perpetrator of assault to be able to commit that act, but
the perpetrator has only a 40% chance of being caught. To deter the assault, the
law would have to set the sanction at $25,000 ($10,000 / 0.40), an amount that
many assault defendants may not possess.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, criminal damages are set not by the
harm done to the victim—as tort damages are—but by the benefit from the crime
to the perpetrator. 29 Because the majority of torts involve unintentional harms,
tort damages must be equal to the expected harm in order to induce potential
tortfeasors to take all efficient precautions. On the other hand, many crimes
involve intentional conduct, and the issue is not the level of precaution but the
criminal’s conscious decision to commit the crime in the first instance.
Accordingly, the penalty need only be high enough such that the criminal will be
in a better situation if he refrains from committing the crime than if he commits it.
In many cases, this means that surprisingly low criminal penalties may be
appropriate. For instance, the appropriate penalty for some murders might be
only a few years in prison, despite the terrible harm involved in murder. The
reason is that many murderers might gain very little benefit from their crimes, and
murderers are apprehended and prosecuted at relatively high rates. Accordingly,
in economic terms, it is not necessary that the punishment match the crime.
However, this analysis is muddied somewhat when one considers optimal
activity and precaution levels. One goal of tort law is to avoid over-deterrence: it
makes no sense for potential tortfeasors to take precautions that are more
expensive than the damages that they might cause. 30 For instance, imagine that
an automobile driver has a 10% chance of causing an accident that will result in
$10,000 in damages. Suppose, however, that tort damages are set at $50,000,
rather than $10,000, in the event of an accident. The driver would now have an
incentive to take a precaution costing $5,000 ($50,000 x 0.10) despite the fact that

28

Emmett H. Miller III, Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 197, 206 (1993) (“Thus, under both approaches, the expected gain or harm represents the
actual gain or harm resulting from the offense multiplied by the probability of detection and
conviction.”).
29
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, Pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J. BENTHAM’S WORKS 396, 402
(J. Bowring ed., 1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than the
apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the consequence of the act,
he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.”).
30
Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2324 (2010)
(explaining that tort law seeks to avoid over-deterrence).
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the expected cost of the damage that this driver will cause is only $1000 ($10,000
x 0.10). Excessive tort damages lead to inefficient behavior. 31
But while this analysis applies straightforwardly to accidents and cases of
negligence, its application to intentional harms is not nearly so clear. Society is
willing to accept that some accidents may occur in the course of lawful driving
because it would be too expensive to take every precaution necessary to prevent
them entirely. Accordingly, the optimal level of accidents is non-zero. 32 Yet it
may be that there is no “precaution” against intentional murder that is not worth
taking. That is, there is nothing that an individual could do to guard against
committing an intentional crime—that is, in deciding not to commit the crime—
that would not be less costly than committing that crime. Accordingly, the
optimal level of intentional murder might be exactly zero. If this is the case,
damages for murder and other serious intentional crimes should be infinite.
Indeed, the strongest economic argument typically made against very high
penalties for serious intentional crimes is the need for marginal deterrence, not the
desire to avoid over-deterrence.
Marginal deterrence is the idea that more serious crimes should be
punished more harshly than less serious crimes in order to deter criminals who
might cause a less serious harm from instead causing a more serious harm. 33 For
instance, if assault and murder were both punished by life in prison, a criminal
who has committed assault would have no incentive not to commit murder (in an
attempt to flee, for instance) because he would face no greater penalty. 34 The
necessity of marginal deterrence means that the penalty for very serious crimes
such as aggravated assault (the optimal level of which is zero) should not, in fact,
be as serious as the penalty for murder.
Marginal deterrence also provides some of the reason that policymakers
have turned to expensive criminal sanctions like imprisonment, rather than relying
solely on monetary penalties. If someone is contemplating causing $100,000
worth of harm but only has the means to pay a $50,000 judgment, then there is no
incentive for him not to cause $200,000 worth of harm—he will reap the extra
benefit without being subject to any additional risk. The threat of a prison
31

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (7th ed. 2007) (describing a
general theory of tort law and efficient behavior).
32
Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets:
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 718 (“In standard torts cases, the optimal level of
accidents is not zero.”).
33
Eyal Zadir and Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints
with Economic Analysis, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 379 n. 211 (2008) (noting that economic theory
requires marginal deterrence if a criminal is to have an incentive not to commit a more serious
crime).
34
Id.
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sentence, which will take from him a resource of which he has a significant
stock—his liberty—will reintroduce a deterrent effect that will prevent the greater
harm. Because prison sentences can be scaled in terms of their length and their
severity, the law can create marginal deterrence along a much wider spectrum of
harm-causing behavior.
Finally, even if every potential defendant were properly capitalized and
able to pay the full measure of damages required after causing harm, there might
nonetheless be some individuals who could not be deterred. This could be due to
mental instability, a tendency to succumb to fits of rage, over-optimism
(regarding the chances of being caught), or any number of other factors that cause
the individual to fall short of perfect rational calculation. 35 Incapacitation is the
proper remedy with respect to such individuals. 36 And of course incapacitation
can only be achieved via incarceration, not monetary damages.
Accordingly, carceral criminal sanctions are justifiable from an economic
perspective because of difficulties in properly deterring potential offenders, most
frequently because they are insolvent or unable to pay the full judgments against
them. This central point will inform much of the discussion that follows.
C.

Property (and Intellectual Property) Crimes

The foregoing discussion focused on harms involving injury to a person.
This is appropriate, as these are the most serious types of crime and present the
clearest case for criminal incarceration. Yet our true focus is on property crimes.
This is an Article about intellectual property, and property crimes such as theft
demand a separate economic justification. Unlike harms involving personal
injuries, there is no obvious economic harm when someone commits a property
crime. Destroying someone’s home or wrecking a car would certainly create
economic harm, but if a thief merely steals a piece of property, nothing of value is
destroyed—the property still exists. Perhaps the theft is just a transfer from one
user to another, not an efficiency loss. If there is no economic harm from theft,
then there is no economic reason to punish it with criminal sanctions.
Although this reasoning may seem intuitive, there are nonetheless
powerful arguments that theft creates economic harm. The first is that theft may
result in an item being transferred from a higher-value user to a lower-value user,

35

See Jonathan S. Masur et al., For General Deterrence, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul
Robinson et al., eds.) (2009) (describing the types of criminals who cannot be deterred through
rational means).
36
See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
120-22 (9th ed. 2012) (explaining a general theory of incapacitation).
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which decreases overall welfare. 37 If an automobile is worth $10,000 to its owner
and only $5,000 to the thief who steals it, then the theft destroys $5,000 in value
just by virtue of the fact that the automobile is transferred from the owner to the
thief. By blocking these types of involuntary transactions, the law forces
individuals into the world of voluntary transactions through which property finds
its way to the highest-value user. Because inventions and creative works are nonrival, however, this argument does not apply in the context of intellectual
property. “Theft” of intellectual property does not deprive the original owner of
its use, so there can be no fear that a higher-value owner has been deprived. We
must, accordingly, look elsewhere for economic justifications for (intellectual)
property crimes.
Theft may also create economic harm by reducing incentives to efficiently
maintain or improve property. 38 If property owners have to fear that their
property might imminently be stolen, they will have no reason to invest in
improving that property, even when it is efficient to do so. 39 Individuals might
even shy away from acquiring property in the first place, even if they would be
higher-value users than the current owners. This argument has particular
resonance for IP.
If someone “steals” intellectual property—that is, infringe it
without having to pay royalties to the owner—the owner will be able to earn only
competitive returns, rather than monopoly profits. As noted above, economic
theory justifies the ability to earn monopoly profits on copyrighted works and
patented inventions because competitive returns will be inadequate to incentivize
intellectual property owners to create and commercialize their ideas.
Accordingly, IP “theft” could reduce incentives to invent or create IP, just as theft
of real or chattel property might reduce incentives to acquire or improve that
property. This would frustrate the economic rationales underlying intellectual
property.
The third and final argument that theft causes economic harm relates to the
steps that owners will take to protect their property from theft. Imagine a country
that decriminalized theft (or that had unreliable police, prosecutors, and courts).
Without the state to protect their property, citizens of that country would
understand that their property was at risk of being taken if they did not protect it

37

Richard A. Posner, Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1196
(1985) (“[Property is] less valuable in an economic sense in [the] hands [of a thief.]”).
38
See Manta, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 477 (“The most obvious harm[]
caused by violations such as theft . . . [is] the potential disincentive for . . . owners to engage in
future productive and socially beneficial endeavors because their resulting profits are at risk of
being stolen.”).
39
Id. (describing the incentives of property owners in a world where theft is rampant).
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themselves. 40 Consequently, they would build high walls around their homes,
install security systems, hire armed guards, train vicious guard dogs, and so
forth. 41 These are socially wasteful activities. They produce little social value,
and they exist only to prevent the transfer of property from one user to another.
Economists thus view the criminal prohibition on theft as a less costly means of
protecting property. 42 Rather than giving private property owners incentives to
invest in wasteful self-help, economists favor centralizing the task of protecting
property in the government, a body that can take advantage of economies of
scale. 43
This rationale also has relevance for IP law. Copyright owners have a
number of available avenues of self-help, including (perhaps most importantly)
digital rights management (DRM). 44 For patent owners, the mechanism for
engaging in self-help is to shift from patents to trade secrets—literally locking
innovation secrets away behind closed doors instead of disclosing them to the
public. 45 We will discuss these mechanisms in much greater detail below. For
now, the general point is that IP owners, like other property owners, may use
expensive self-help as an alternative if legal prohibitions on theft appear
inadequate.
40

See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 474 (1976)
(“[T]he thief upset[s] the social order not only by threatening property, but by violating the general
sense of security and well-being of the community; . . . theft [is] feared as a socially unnerving
event.”).
41
Posner, supra note 37, at 1196 (“[I]f [a thief is] allowed to take the car [of his neighbor, his]
neighbor will have an incentive to expend resources on preventing it from being taken, and these
expenditures considered as a whole, yield no social product.”); see also Robert P. Merges, Peter
Seth Menell & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (6th ed.
2012) (making this point about trade secrets).
42
Id. (arguing the role of the criminal law is discoursing market bypassing); see also William E.
Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical
Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 465 (1967) (examining criminal law’s historical development
from an instrument enforcing the community’s moral values to one focused on “deter[ring] attacks
on property”).
43
See e.g., Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107
(“[T]he benefits from coordinating enforcement-for example, avoiding duplication of investigative
effort and exploiting economies of scale in information processing-are obtained under public
enforcement and monopolistic enforcement, but not under competitive enforcement.”). Cf. Amitai
Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 765 (2012) (“[P]rivate actors are
often poor enforcers because they lack the economies of scale (such as investigative expertise and
litigation experience) that come with repeated enforcement, and because most people have fewer
financial means to pursue enforcement than public actors.”).
44
See infra Part II.
45
J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923 (2011) (describing the
tradeoffs between trade secret and patent protection and the decisions faced by innovators).

13

There is one final distinctive feature of property crimes worth addressing,
and it is the likelihood that a thief (as opposed to, say, a murderer) would be able
to pay off a civil judgment. At first glance it might appear that property criminals
are less likely to be judgment-proof than criminals who have injured a person.
One reason is that property crimes often cause less harm than personal injury
crimes. Another reason is that a thief will often have one asset that can be used to
pay the judgment: the stolen property itself. This is not a panacea; as we
explained above, the proper measure of damages for a crime might well be many
times greater than the actual harm caused if the probability of detection and
punishment is low. But it nevertheless places property criminals on a somewhat
different footing than criminals who injure other people.
*

*

*

We have identified a number of factors relevant to the question of whether
criminal penalties should be applied to prevent some type of undesirable activity.
In the interest of clarity, we summarize those factors here:
1. What is the magnitude of the economic harm from the activity, and
what are the benefits to the infringer?
2. What is the probability that violations will be detected and prosecuted?
3. Will the defendant likely have sufficient funds to pay a judgment?
4. Is the economically efficient activity level zero or greater than zero?
5. Will it be desirable to incapacitate offenders?
In the Parts that follow, we consider the issue of criminal sanctions for copyright
and patent infringement through the economic lens of these factors.
II. THE LIMITED CASE FOR CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
Over the course of the last century, the availability of criminal sanctions
for copyright infringement has expanded dramatically. 46 Driven in large part by
46

I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 315
(2002) (hereinafter Criminal Copyright). Congress enacted the first criminal copyright statute in
1897. It applied only to the unauthorized performance of plays and music. See Act of Jan. 6,
1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. In 1909, Congress expanded liability to cover all copyrightable works.

14

lobbying from the Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA) and the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), criminal copyright law has
grown to cover a wider variety of content and behavior, and the penalties for
violations have multiplied. 47 According to these advocacy groups, criminal
sanctions, including substantial imprisonment terms, are needed to deter the rising
tide of copyright “theft.” 48
This Part addresses those arguments from the perspective of economic
analysis of law. We suggest that, according to the standard economic account of
criminal law, there might be narrow situations in which criminal sanctions could
be theoretically justified for deterring copyright violations and improving overall
social welfare. Below, we describe when criminal copyright liability might be
valuable and when it might not, and we assess current U.S. copyright law in light
of our findings.
A. The Harm of Copyright Infringement
Economic analysis suggests that criminal law can be valuable in situations
where people must be deterred from conduct that reduces overall social welfare. 49
When people steal, rape, and kill the reduction in social welfare and the need for
deterrence is obvious. In Part I, we explained how and when criminal sanctions
can be used to reduce occurrences of these behaviors. But in what way is illegally
downloading a song or streaming a bootlegged signal of a soccer match
equivalent to these heinous acts? How is watching a pre-release version of the
latest blockbuster movie a crime? From an economic perspective, the answer
See Copyright Act of 1090, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century,
Congress further expanded criminal liability and enhanced the magnitude of criminal penalties.
Copyright infringement could result in felony convictions, defendants could be found guilty even
in the absence of a purpose for financial gain, and maximum sentence lengths grew. Piracy and
Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (creating felony liability
for copyright violations); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. NO. 105-147, 111 Stat.
2678-80 (amending the criminal provisions to allow criminal conviction in the absence of a
showing that the defendant was motivated by commercial purpose or financial gain); Sentecing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (extending maximum sentence length for
criminal copyright violation from two to five years of imprisonment).
47
See Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness – Is Congress Making a
Scarecrow of the Law?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 28 (2002) (noting that the Net Act “enjoys strong
support from the Software Publishers Association, U.S. Copyright Office, the Department of
Justice, Adobe Software, Microsoft Corporation, the Recording Industry of America, and the
Motion Picture Association of America”).
48
On property metaphors in copyright, see WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT
WARS (2009).
49
See supra Part I.
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depends on the extent to which copyright infringement causes harm that cannot be
deterred by other means. Copyright infringement can enter the domain of
criminal law when other mechanisms for deterring socially harmful conduct,
including civil sanctions and self-help remedies, are either too costly or
unsuccessful. 50
1. Copyright Infringement and Incentives
In order to determine the extent to which deterrence, whether criminal or
otherwise, is appropriate, we must first understand the harms caused by the
unauthorized copying of creative works. Although copyright is a form of
intellectual property, and although many people refer to copyright infringement as
“theft,” 51 infringement is importantly different from theft of real or personal
property. 52 With copyright infringement, the original owner is not deprived of the
use of the infringed content. 53 When someone illegally photocopies a novel, the
copyright owner is not prevented from reading the novel herself. But the issue is
not with the copyright owner’s use of the novel but with her incentives to write it
in the first place. The harm of unauthorized copying arises from the public goods
problem in IP and the law’s solution to that problem. 54 When someone
downloads a song for free off the internet rather than paying for it on iTunes, the
creator’s ex ante incentives to create diminish. For every person who opts out of
an available market transaction for the song, the creator will tend to invest that
much less in the quality and quantity of new songs she produces. And if enough
50

Moohr, Overcriminalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7-8 (“Whether
criminal penalties are an appropriate way to deal with copyright infringement depends on whether
the strategy confers a net social benefit, which is found in intellectual property policy.”).
51
During Congressional hearings on the NET Act, Senator Patrick Leahy declared, “Just as we
will not tolerate the theft of software, CDs or books from a store, so we will not tolerate the
stealing of intellectual property over the Internet.” Copyright Piracy on the Internet: Hearing on
H.R. 2265 before the House Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). See also Green, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
240 (noting that many recently enacted criminal IP laws have in common “at least a literal
commitment to the idea that intellectual property of various sorts might be subject to ‘theft’ or to
being ‘stolen.’”).
52
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the difference between copyright infringement and
theft of real or personal property. In Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985), the Court rejected
the government’s interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act that “would make theft,
conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of statutorily protected rights in
copyright.”
53
Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. at 216 (“The copyright owner…holds no ordinary chattel. A
copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully
delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact protections.”).
54
See supra Part I.A.
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people download songs for free rather than paying for them, the creator may cease
making music altogether. To ensure that the appropriate level of incentives
remains, people must be deterred from making unauthorized copies of works.
2. The Efficient Level of Copying
Like theft and murder, unauthorized copying of expressive works can
create harm and reduce overall social welfare. But unlike theft and murder, where
the optimal amount of those behaviors is at or very near zero, the optimal amount
of unauthorized copying may be significantly greater than zero. Certain kinds of
copying may be beneficial, and deterring them would be harmful. 55
First, as we noted in Part I.A, the ability to charge monopoly prices above
marginal cost creates deadweight losses that can be inefficient. For example,
imagine that the marginal cost of producing a copy of a movie is $2. Because the
copyright owner has an exclusive right to copy the movie, she can charge $10 for
a copy of the movie. The owner’s ability to sell the movie at $10 to the many
people who value having a copy of the movie at $10 or greater provides the owner
with the opportunity to recoup her investment. But what if some person values
the movie at $5? He is unwilling to pay the price for the movie, and, without the
ability for the owner to price discriminate, 56 the difference between what he is
willing to pay and the marginal cost of the copy represents inefficient, deadweight
loss. 57
The situation here is different from that of theft of real property. As
William Landes and Richard Posner explain:

55

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 335 (1989) (“Some copyright protection is necessary to generate the incentives to
incur the costs of creating easily copied works, but too much protection can raise the costs of
creation for subsequent authors to the point where those authors cannot cover them even though
they have complete copyright protection for their own originality.”).
56
Price discrimination can occur in some situations involving copyrightable works. For example,
copyright owners charge higher prices for hardback editions and first-run movies because some
people value being able to consume the work rapidly. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at 39. Price discrimination is also possible through the use of digital
rights management technologies (DRM), which we discuss infra at Part II.B.1.
57
See Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 426-31 (2003); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis,
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and
Network Effects, 18 HARV. J. L. TECH. 435, 440-41 (2005) (“Copyright engenders a deadweight
loss as a by-product of the incentives to create that it provides. A system of private ownership
providing the incentive for creation cannot give a reward to the creator without also having an
apparent deadweight loss in the consumption market.”).
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If a thief steals a Rolls-Royce from the dealer’s lot, it is no consolation to
the dealer that the thief was not a potential customer because he could not
afford to pay the dealer’s price; the theft deprived the dealer the
opportunity to sell the Rolls to someone else. But when the purchaser of a
software program makes a copy for someone else, he does not reduce the
number of copies in the software producer’s inventory. If the someone
else was not a potential purchaser from the producer, the producer loses
nothing from the unauthorized copying.” 58
Thus, if the owner is able to sufficiently recoup her investment in the movie,
deterring people who value the work at above marginal cost but below the
copyright owner’s price may be unnecessary or even counter-productive.
Second, and more importantly, some unauthorized uses of a work might
be efficient and socially valuable but nonetheless fail to arise due to market
failures. Although economic analysis generally trusts markets to efficiently
allocate goods to valuable uses, 59 some users of copyrighted works engage in a
variety of behaviors that are unlikely to result in market transactions. For
example, authors of copyrighted works are unlikely to license use of their works
to others for criticism and parody, yet these are generally believed to be socially
beneficial activities. 60 In other situations, transaction costs may prevent otherwise
efficient bargains from arising. 61 Someone wishing the transform a work or use it
in a way that creates significant value that she is unable to capture may be
unwilling to pay the necessary licensing fee. In these situations, the “fair use”
provisions of the U.S. copyright act allow others the right to freely use
copyrighted works, because those uses are considered to be welfare-enhancing
and because market transactions are unlikely to provide them in sufficient
quantity. 62

58

See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at 47. The authors give the
example of weak demand for AIDS drugs in Africa.
59
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (explaining how, in
a world without transaction costs, voluntary market transactions will result in entitlements being
owned by their highest valuing user).
60
See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright
Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 85-90 (1991).
61
See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31 (2011) (describing inefficiencies in IP markets that may arise from biased assessments of
a work’s value); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (same).
62
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604–05 (1982).
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Deterring the behaviors discussed above is not valuable. 63 They tend to
create significant benefits with relatively little harm to creators’ incentives. Uses
of a copyrighted work for criticism, parody, or education make many people’s
lives better off, and the inability to charge for them is unlikely to deter creation. 64
Although they may marginally decrease incentives to create, the optimal amount
of these behaviors is decidedly above zero.
Other uses of a work, however, will tend to generate little benefit but have
significant social costs. When people download copies of movies or songs for
free when they would have been willing to pay the copyright owner’s price they
are creating inefficiencies. Assuming that the law has properly balanced the costs
and benefits of copyright protection, 65 this diminution in the copyright owner’s
ability to recoup her investment costs is harmful. 66
B. The Economics of Deterring Copyright Infringement
The unauthorized copying of expressive works, at least in some instances,
can harm social welfare by undermining the incentives of authors to invest in their
creations. Deterring these cases of unauthorized copying would be valuable.
Economic analysis describes the various tools that might be brought to bear to do
so, including private self-help and public law solutions. 67 This section explores
63

Landes & Posner, JLS, supra note 55, at 340 (“An increase in copyright protection is likely to
reduce the welfare benefits (consumer plus producer surplus) generated by a given work—
assuming it will be created.”).
64
See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970 (2012).
65
As noted above, we believe that Congress has done a poor job of balancing the incentives of
authors with the rights of the public. Copyright terms are far too long, and the scope of copyright
holders’ rights is far too broad. See Christopher Buccafusco & Paul Heald, Do Bad Things Happen
When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, BERK.
TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2013) (presenting empirical data which suggest that the works suffer
little economic harm when they enter the public domain); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 57.
66
Recent empirical research on the effects of music and movie downloading on sales has
suggested significant decreases in sales as a result of downloading. Stan Liebowitz, File-sharing:
Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?: J. L. & ECON. 1 (2006). We wish to emphasize
again, however, that a mere decrease in sales does not alone show that overall social welfare has
been diminished. See also Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing
on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007). Irina Manta compares the
harm of copyright infringement to vandalism. Manta, Puzzle, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 475.
67
As Trotter Hardy notes, owners of informational goods do not necessarily require copyright
protection. They have a variety of techniques available to them. Hardy describes four different
types of protection against unauthorized copying: “1) entitlement-like protection; 2) contract-like
protection; 3) state-of-the-art limitations; and 4) special purpose technical limitations.” Trotter
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the effectiveness and desirability of self-help and civil law sanctions in the
copyright context.
1. Self-help and DRM
Like owners of real property who attempt to prevent others from
trespassing on their land by building fences, copyright owners who seek to deter
unauthorized copying can attempt to limit access or use of their works.
Traditionally, this was a difficult task for copyright owners. Once a book was put
into circulation, there was little the copyright owner could do to prevent others
from copying it, lending it, or performing it publicly. Copyright law and the civil
sanctions it creates are a response to this problem. With the rise of digital copies
of expressive works that are embodied in computer software and hardware,
however, copyright owners can create technological limits on the things that users
can do with copies. Known as digital rights management (DRM), these
technological measures can limit the ability of users to make copies of a work, to
transfer the work between different devices, or to modify the work. 68
DRM can be very attractive to copyright owners because it can provide
almost total control over the behavior of users. 69 For example, if the copyright
owner of a movie makes copies of the movie available in video cassettes, a
purchaser of a video cassette could easily copy the movie for a number of her
friends with only limited loss in quality. Some of these friends might have been
potential purchasers of the movie, and their ability to get the free copy could harm
the copyright owner. Now, however, the copyright owner can release the movie
on a DVD that is coded with DRM software that prevents the purchaser from
making copies. 70 The same is potentially true for purchasers of ebooks, CDs,
software, and other digital content that is downloaded online.
Although DRM seems like an efficient self-help measure to prevent
unauthorized copying, its use is highly controversial, 71 and its overall effect on
social welfare is probably negative. DRM’s principal economic benefit is that it
Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEG. F. 217, 223. Our analysis will
primarily focus on the first and fourth techniques that Hardy mentions.
68
Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management: Musings on Emerging
Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ASPECTS 597 (Eberhard Becker et al., eds. 2003).
69
Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2003) (“Copyright
holders might prefer a world in which the rights granted under statute or asserted via license
became self-enforcing. Something close to this can be achieved through the employment of
technological devices accompanying copies of a work as they are distributed.”).
70
Id.
71
See Bechtold, supra note 68, at 598.

20

can be relatively cheaply created and implemented. Coding DRM software is not
difficult, and, once created, including the DRM code in copies of a work is
effectively costless for the producer. 72 Accordingly, it is unlike the relatively
costly self-help measures that property owners must create and maintain to
prevent trespass or theft. 73 To prevent someone from stealing a book from a
store, the owner must pay security personnel or install other physical detection
devices in each copy. To prevent someone from making unauthorized copies of
an ebook, the producer simply needs to include a string of code in the ebook
digital file. 74
Despite its ease and low cost, DRM might be an inefficient solution to the
problem of unauthorized copying of expressive works. 75 First, users of many
kinds of products object to the limitations that DRM establishes. Consumers of
music, movies, and software have developed norms about the kinds of uses that
should be allowed, and they balk when content providers attempt to restrict those
uses. Recently, in response to consumer complaints, Apple’s iTunes service and
other online music distributors have dramatically scaled back their use of DRM.
Similarly, consumers have expressed dismay at Microsoft’s announcement that it
will include highly restrictive DRM provisions in the release of its new Xbox
game console. 76 Although DRM still places a major role in attempting to protect
against unauthorized uses of movies, ebooks, and computer software, there is
reason to think that negative consumer responses will increasingly limit its
effectivenessaddition, DRM has proven less valuable than was hoped, because the
code can be circumvented. Programmers who desire to use a work in a way that
is forbidden by DRM can “hack” the code and nullify its effectiveness. 77 As with

72

Of course, consumers may prefer to own copies of works that are not encrypted with DRM, so
the amount they are willing the pay for DRM-encrypted copies will be less. Consumer resistance
to DRM likely had some effect on Apple’s decision to release music on iTunes in “DRM-free”
versions. Yet even these versions are not truly DRM free as they only allow purchasers to play
songs on a limited number of devices.
73
See supra note Part I.B.
74
See Bechtold, supra note 68, at 598.
75
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 471 (1998) (“Digital technologies allow more effective
fencing of intellectual property, and thus cure some of the market failure problems associated with
creative and informational works—although…they have the potential to create market failures of a
different sort.”); Burk, supra note 69, at 1097 (arguing that “the anticircumvention right is being,
and will continue to be, abused.”).
76
Anthony Tosie, Nintendo Disagrees with Microsoft’s DRM Policies, Neowin (June 13, 2013)
available at http://www.neowin.net/news/nintendo-disagrees-with-microsofts-drm-policies.
77
Burk, supra note 69, at1102 (“The drawback to reliance primarily upon technological controls is
that technically sophisticated users may find ways to circumvent or disable the control system, and
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real or personal property, this leads to an inefficient “arms race” between content
producers and hackers as they each expend costly resources attempting to
alternately protect and break DRM code. Although initially creating and
installing the DRM is inexpensive, creating multiple iterations of the code to
outpace hackers can get very expensive. In the U.S., the law has attempted to
avert this arms race by prohibiting the circumvention of technological barriers to
use. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibits the use or
distribution of circumvention measures and subjects violators to civil and criminal
penalties. 78
While the DMCA minimizes the risk of an inefficient arms race between
content providers and hackers, DRM-based self-help creates other significant
inefficiencies. As noted above, not all unauthorized copying of expressive works
is harmful to social welfare. Many unauthorized uses of copyrighted works,
especially those classified as fair uses under the copyright act, significantly
enhance social welfare. As yet, and perhaps inevitably, DRM technology is
unable to distinguish between infringing and noninfringing uses of protected
works. 79 DRM affects the professor who wants to excerpt a portion of a book for
educational purposes in class just as much as it does the e-book purchaser who
wants to make copies of the file for all of his friends. While the latter use is
welfare diminishing, the former is welfare enhancing, but both are prohibited by
DRM.
Users who wish to make socially valuable fair uses of a DRM-protected
work can attempt to circumvent the technological protection, but they do so at
considerable risk. First, although the Librarian of Congress exempts certain uses
of copyrighted works from the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,80
U.S. courts have not agreed about whether every fair use of a copyrighted work is
exempt. 81 Accordingly, unless users fall within one of the express exemptions
may even assist unsophisticated users in doing so. A skilled user may be able to ‘hack around’ the
controls built into technological content systems.”).
78
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). It is important to note that violation of the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions is not considered violation of copyright. DMCA violations create independent civil
and criminal liability. Hardy, Criminal Copyright, supra note 46, at 322.
79
Stefan Bechtold discusses the possibility of creating DRM technologies that can distinguish
between appropriate and inappropriate uses of a protected work. Bechtold, supra note 68, at 604.
80
Burk, supra note 69, at 1104.
81
Court opinions have differed on the relationship between DMCA and fair use. Compare
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1318-19 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (holding that a copyright holder must show a connection to copyright infringement in
order to succeed in a claim under the DMCA); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies,
Inc. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that distribution of a circumvention device--in that
case a garage door opener--did not violate the anti-circumvention provisions because its use did
not lead to any copyright violation) with Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
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(which appear to change annually), they risk being subject to heavy civil and
criminal fines and possibly imprisonment. Second, even if circumvention of
DRM is acceptable for fair use of a work, the contours of the fair use doctrine are
notoriously fuzzy. Whether a given behavior is copyright infringement or fair use
depends on a difficult-to-predict balancing of multiple factors. Risk averse parties
whose conduct lies on the boundaries of fair use may elect to avoid engaging in
potentially valuable behavior to avoid liability under the DMCA. 82
Individuals’ willingness and ability to circumvent DRM creates a perverse
effect on the kinds of copying that does and does not get prevented by DRM.
Law-abiding individuals who wish to make fair or personal uses of copyrighted
content will generally also be those who are unable or unwilling to circumvent
DRM technology, while those individuals who engage in large scale direct
copying of works for economic or reputational reasons will tend to be able and
willing to hack DRM code. This means that DRM tends to have its greatest
deterrent effect on socially valuable conduct and only limited effect on harmful
conduct, thereby shifting the costs generated by harmful copiers to beneficial
copiers.
A final, and significant, concern about the use of DRM self-help is that it
can be used to protect content that does not enjoy copyright protection. 83 For
example, DRM can be applied to works whose copyright terms have expired and
should be freely available in the public domain. DRM might also be
inappropriately applied to content that fails to meet the requirements of
copyrightability, including nonoriginal data. 84 The balance copyright law creates
between creator incentives and public uses is threatened if content providers
respond to the risk of unauthorized copying by protecting these works with DRM.
It is difficult to judge the net welfare effects of DRM self-help. In its
favor are low cost and ease of use, but set against these are the significant chilling
effects that DRM has on valuable behaviors. DRM prevents many important uses
of expressive works, and the penalties attached to DRM circumvention likely
diminish behaviors that are at the core of human well-being. Given the risks of
DRM, it is appropriate to consider other methods for deterring harmful
unauthorized copying.
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2. Civil Sanctions and Deterrence
The standard economic response to costly self-help is the provision of
civil sanctions with penalties sufficient to deter harmful behavior. 85 According to
economic theory, people will be deterred from engaging in harmful activities if
the law establishes penalties that equal or exceed the magnitude of the benefits
violators can hope to achieve from their conduct. Copyright law does precisely
this. Infringement of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights subjects the violator to
civil liability that is intended to deter such violations. For a number of reasons,
however, the effectiveness of civil remedies in certain situations is doubtful.
a. Comparing Benefits and Harms
Economic theory predicts that the law can deter undesirable conduct,
including copyright infringement, by creating penalties that exceed the benefits
that can be obtained from engaging in the conduct. For example, if someone is
contemplating either purchasing or illegally downloading for free $100 worth of
music, the existence of a fine of $100 or more for the illegal behavior will result
in her choosing to purchase the music rather than violate the law. The benefits of
violating the law to the would-be infringer are smaller than the costs of doing so,
and a rational person would be deterred from downloading the music.
Typically, economic analysis assumes that the magnitude of the penalty
sufficient to achieve deterrence is marginally higher than the value of the harm
done to the victim. Thus, if the penalty for stealing a $10,000 car is $10,001,
rational people will prefer to purchase the car rather than steal it. The benefits to
the violator are generally considered to be equivalent to the harms of the victim
(plus any additional social harm). In the context of copyright infringement,
however, this may not be the case. First, as mentioned above, much copyright
infringement is the result of people who value the work at a price between the
marginal cost of producing it and the monopoly price charged by the copyright
owner. If, for example, someone illegally downloads ten albums that cost $10
each, but if she only values those albums at $5 each, setting the penalty for
infringement at $100 will lead to overdeterrence of behavior that is not costly.
More difficult still is the situation involving the large category of
copyright infringement that is mostly divorced from economic considerations.
Much large-scale copyright infringement on the internet does not appear to be
motivated by a desire to obtain works for free. 86 Many hackers and members of
85
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“warez” communities derive benefits from copyright infringement from the
reputational effects of successfully circumventing DRM and providing copies of
works for free on the internet. 87 Comparing the magnitude of the benefits these
hackers experience with the harms to copyright owners is extremely difficult. On
one hand, the market-based values that hackers experience are likely much
smaller than the net value of the infringements that result from the hackers’
conduct. On the other hand, the emotional and reputational benefits that they
experience may be very great indeed and thus difficult to deter. 88 Accordingly,
setting the appropriate magnitude of civil sanctions necessary for deterrence of
copyright violation will be challenging.
b. Detection, Punitive Damages, and Judgment Proof Infringers
By far the most problematic issue with the use of civil remedies to deter
copyright infringement involves the difficulty of detecting infringing behavior.
As we described in Part I, setting the magnitude of the penalty equal to a potential
lawbreaker’s benefits will only achieve deterrence when the probability of a
violation being detected is one hundred percent. If the penalty equals the
lawbreaker’s benefits and if detection is imperfect, the expected benefits of
violating the law will exceed the expected harms. In order to solve this problem,
economic theory suggests that the law rely on punitive (or augmented 89) damages
to create a damages multiplier that will account for imperfect detection. 90
Copyright law, with the availability of statutory damages, 91 provides something
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similar to this, but for a number of reasons it is unlikely to create sufficient
deterrence. 92
Deterring copyright infringement is different in the digital age. 93 When
making an unauthorized copy of a work required expensive professional
machinery to print books or copy film strips, detecting infringement was
relatively easy. 94 Now, millions of people own devices that can instantly create
and distribute infringing copies around the world. Successfully policing all of
these people is impossible, and the likelihood that any individual infringement
will be detected is infinitesimal. 95 Even large scale infringements of multiple
works are unlikely to be detected at levels significantly above zero. In addition,
even if copyright owners are able to detect the existence of an infringement,
connecting it to a specific person will be incredibly difficult. Potential infringers
are spread out around the world and hidden behind IP addresses that mask their
identities.
From the perspective of economic analysis, the damages multiplier that
would be necessary to raise expected penalties from infringement above expected
benefits will be very large. If only one-tenth of one percent of copyright
infringements are detected (probably a generous figure), 96 the damages multiplier
is 1000. This means that if an infringer causes $200 worth of harm, she will be
responsible for $200,000 in damages.
Copyright infringement damages of this magnitude create will tend not to
have the appropriate effect on marginal deterrence, because many defendants will
be judgment proof for these amounts. In the past, significant resources were
92
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necessary to engage in large scale copyright infringement. 97 The commercial
enterprises that were capable of producing many copies of bootlegged recordings
or unauthorized books would generally have been able to pay significant
infringement damages. Now, when an eighteen-year-old college student can
infringe thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of copyrights,
the likelihood that defendants will have the resources necessary to compensate
plaintiffs is low. 98 Since the magnitude of copyright liability will often exceed
infringers’ ability to pay, 99 impecunious infringers will not be subject to
significant deterrence. If a potential infringer is unable to pay $2,000,000 worth of
damages, there is nothing deterring him from causing $3,000,000 worth of harm.
Thus, for certain classes of copyright infringers—private actors with
limited resources engaged in large scale infringement—the threat of civil
sanctions may be insufficient to establish deterrence. These actors will tend not to
have the capital available to meet the kinds of high magnitude damage awards
that low levels of detection necessitate.
3. Secondary Liability
Although individual infringers may not have the resources necessary to
satisfy large civil damages awards, many of them use intermediaries to distribute
unauthorized copies of works. By suing these intermediaries, including filesharing websites and internet service providers (ISPs), can copyright holders
efficiently deter infringement? 100
In theory, subjecting intermediaries to
97
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secondary liability can lower the costs of detecting and suing individual
infringers. It also attaches liability to parties that are less likely to be judgment
proof and creates incentives for intermediaries to monitor the behavior of users. 101
Copyright law’s secondary liability doctrines of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability enable such lawsuits, but, as with all such strategies, we must
determine whether they generate more benefits than costs. 102 We suspect that
enhanced use of secondary liability will not deter enough harmful behavior to
offset its potential effects on legitimate behavior.
First, although file-sharing websites like Napster and Grokster and content
hosting platforms like YouTube have been largely responsible for the expansion
in unauthorized copying in the digital age, 103 much copyright infringement still
occurs without intermediaries. Parties who produce bootlegged copies of CDs
and DVDs to sell on street corners and over the internet typically do not rely on
intermediaries to distribute content.
When they do, the intermediary’s
relationship to the infringing behavior will often be too insignificant to trigger
secondary liability. 104 In these circumstances, secondary liability simply does not
reach the infringing content.
Second, many intermediaries would suffer from the deterrence problems
that arise for individual infringers, i.e., that they are undercapitalized relative to
the magnitudes of judgments and that they are often run by groups with political
rather than economic motivations that make them hard to deter. 105 The cost of the
infrastructure necessary to run a file-sharing website consisting of servers and
other hardware, while not inconsiderable, is still relatively small compared to the
size of a judgment that could be levied against it. The value of the infringing
content shared on a website like BitTorrent, even ignoring the availability of
statutory damages, likely dwarfs that of the resources used to make it available.
Finally, secondary liability doctrines, which make intermediaries
responsible for the behavior of their users, could chill valuable speech. Although
much of the behavior taking place on BitTorrent websites involves socially
harmful unauthorized copying, there is considerable activity on websites like
YouTube that is socially beneficial. To the extent that intermediaries are subject
101
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to liability for copyright violations of their users, they are likely to be risk averse
in the face of threatened lawsuits and thus readily limit access for users who are
engaging in valuable speech at the boundary of infringement. 106 For example,
although the DMCA creates “safe harbor” provisions that shield intermediaries
who respond to copyright takedown notices sent by content owners, those
intermediaries have very little interest in carefully screening contested claims of
unauthorized use. 107 It is easier and less risky for them to simply remove the
contested content. Accordingly, we fear that expanded use of secondary liability
might be more costly in terms of overall social welfare.
C. The Theoretical Case for Criminal Copyright Sanctions
Deterring socially harmful copyright infringement with DRM and civil
sanctions may be difficult and costly in some settings. Creating deterrence for
judgment-proof infringers using civil sanctions alone may be impossible. In
response, copyright owners can turn to technological measures to prevent
infringement in the first place. But as we have shown, reliance on self-help can
itself create social costs. DRM will tend to protect uncopyrightable content, and
it will prevent fair and valuable uses of copyrightable material. Accordingly, it is
worth considering the possible value of criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment, as a deterrent to harmful copyright infringement. In this section,
we propose a limited scope for the efficient use of criminal sanctions in copyright
law. In addition, we discuss some possible caveats to our proposal, and we
address some arguments in favor of criminal copyright liability that we believe
are incorrect.
1. The Benefits of Criminal Sanctions
As we explained in Part I, economic analysis recognizes certain cases
when criminal penalties can be more efficient than other mechanisms for
deterring harmful conduct. Criminal penalties are valuable when self-help is
costly and when civil remedies are insufficient to deter behavior. These two
factors are likely true for some kinds of copyright infringement. Yet the existence
of some deterrence benefits does not necessarily mean that criminal sanctions are
efficient. They should only be adopted if the deterrence benefits exceed the costs
of their use.
When a rock star infringes the copyright of another singer’s song, criminal
sanctions will not be necessary. The likelihood that the infringement will be
106
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detected is high, and the rock star will probably be able to pay the resulting
damages award. This is not the case, however, for a private person who uploads
hundreds of copyrighted files onto the internet. Detection of these behaviors is
low, so the magnitude of the damages award necessary to create deterrence will
almost certainly swamp the person’s assets. A potential infringer may not be
dissuaded at all by the threat of a judgment so large that it can never be paid.108
And high-magnitude damages awards eliminate the possibility of marginal
deterrence—once the damages award exceeds the infringer’s present and future
resources, there is nothing stopping her from infringing further.
Because monetary damages are unlikely to deter individual large scale
infringers, criminal sanctions may be appropriate. The threat of imprisonment or
some type of alternative sanction may create the necessary deterrence against
socially harmful copyright violations.109 The alternative sanctions that we have in
mind are those that have often been used in cybercrime prosecutions—
prohibitions on the ownership or use of technologies that are capable of violating
copyrights. 110 This means that for some period of time, people convicted of
criminal copyright infringement would be subject to prohibitions or limitations on
their use of computers, cell phones, tablets, and other electronic devices. 111 For
deterrence purposes, alternative sanctions will be cheaper to enforce than
incarceration, and they may have an important deterrent bite between potentially
underdeterring civil sanctions and potentially overdeterring incarceration.
Perhaps more important than their deterrent effect, however, is the incapacitative
effect of alternative sanctions. If enforced, these sanctions should prohibit
108
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offenders from engaging in future copyright infringements. Incapacitation will be
particularly valuable from an economic perspective for those defendants, like
warez traders and the ringleaders of file sharing sites, who are difficult to deter
because of their political beliefs. If they are causing harm and other penalties do
not deter them, incapacitation through imprisonment or alternative sanctions can
prevent the harmful behavior.
The recently implemented Copyright Alert System may go a significant
way towards creating the kinds of deterrence and incapacitation that alternative
criminal sanctions would. 112 The system, which was implemented in February
2013 by the Center for Copyright Information, tracks the online behavior of users
of BitTorrent websites. Users who are detected engaging in illegal file sharing
will receive multiple notifications of their detection and warnings against
continued file sharing. After the fifth or sixth such alert, users may be subject to
severe temporary limitations on their internet bandwidth that would prevent more
file sharing. Although the Copyright Alert System has received criticism from
some academics and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 113 its use may be less
controversial and more efficient than the alternative of highly punitive civil or
criminal sanctions.
Before discussing the costs of criminal copyright liability, we should
address one argument in favor of criminal liability that we do not find persuasive
in this context. As noted in Part I, public detection and prosecution of harmful
conduct can be more efficient than private enforcement because economies of
scale favor a single police force and because private individuals may struggle to
enforce laws on their own. If two people are both robbed, it is inefficient for both
of them to investigate the crime when the police could combine the investigations.
Owners of copyrights, however, are well organized and represented by major
industry associations that can devote the necessary resources to detecting and
litigating infringements. So although a single infringer may be violating
copyrights of many different owners, the RIAA and MPAA appear willing and
able to police this conduct. In fact, much of the criminal investigation performed
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by the Justice Department occurs following notification of infringing behavior by
these associations. 114
2. The Costs of Criminal Sanctions
Although imposing criminal penalties for copyright infringement may
have some deterrent benefits, it is not without costs. The most obvious costs of
criminal copyright infringement are the costs of detection, enforcement,
prosecution, and sanction. The costs of detecting and prosecuting copyright
infringement are typically shared by the public (via the Department of Justice)
and organizations that represent the victims (the RIAA, MPAA, and software
organizations and companies). These costs are often steep. In addition,
imprisoning offenders creates significant costs: prisons are expensive to operate,
inmates are no longer productive members of society, and imprisonment creates a
variety of additional harms to offenders and society. 115 The social harms caused
by unauthorized copying would have to be extremely large in order to justify the
significant costs of detecting, prosecuting, and imprisoning copyright infringers.
Accordingly, if the technological prohibitions mentioned above have significant
deterrent effect, they will be much less costly to administer.
Infringement liability is intended to deter people from engaging in socially
harmful unauthorized copying, but because copying can also serve socially
valuable purposes, enhanced penalties risk chilling some beneficial conduct. 116
Some people may refrain from valuable but legally questionable conduct if the
penalties for infringement increase. 117 The likelihood of this happening will
depend on the similarity between acceptable and unacceptable conduct and the
difficulty of predicting ex ante whether certain behaviors are legal or not. 118
As we describe above, one of the principal benefits of civil or criminal
sanctions to deter copyright infringement is the reduction in socially wasteful selfhelp. If criminal sanctions lead to improved deterrence of copyright infringement,
copyright holders would no longer need to rely on DRM to prevent infringement.
The reduction in overbroad DRM usage that eliminates (or at least makes more
costly) much socially valuable conduct is the chief goal of enhanced deterrence.
Whether content owners would refrain from using DRM is, however, unclear.
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The creation and use of DRM code is relatively cheap for content owners, and this
is especially true because the DMCA minimizes the costs of an arms race with
hackers. Moreover, DRM generates significant benefits for copyright holders in
addition to preventing illegal copying. DRM enables copyright holders to protect
works beyond their copyright term and to protect content that is not an
appropriate subject for copyright law. DRM also can significantly increase the
costs of fair use. As we described, circumventing DRM for fair uses may not be
exempted from the DMCA, and even if it is, the uncertainty of whether conduct is
in fact fair use will deter many risk-averse users. This may be entirely consistent
with the preferences of copyright holders: much fair use, especially criticism and
parody, will be objectionable to copyright owners. Since the reduction in DRM
usage is the main benefit we anticipate from criminal liability, it is important to
know whether it would actually occur.
One solution to this problem is for Congress to disallow DRM entirely.
Since DRM can be socially harmful, and since the justification for the costs of
criminal sanctions is the reduction of DRM usage, Congress could simply prevent
the distribution of copyright works in media that include technological protection
measures.
A final category of costs worth mentioning includes the possible effects of
imposing criminal liability on conduct that many people believe does not warrant
it. There is considerable variation in people’s beliefs about the harms of
copyright infringement. 119 Many people believe that downloading music and
movies from the internet is not harmful at all and certainly should not subject
offenders to imprisonment. 120 Stark divergence between social norms about
behavior and legal rules governing it can be very costly. 121 When norms and law
diverge, people’s respect for the law decreases, and their compliance rate
declines. 122 Thus, if people believe that criminal sanctions are inappropriate for
copyright infringement, the benefits of deterrence will be weaker. 123 As with
119
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DRM, however, the precise effect of criminal copyright liability on norms is
difficult to predict. It is also possible that the imposition and effective
enforcement of criminal sanctions for violating copyright law could help people
understand the harm of copyright infringement, resulting in greater convergence
between social attitudes and the law.
Subject to these important qualifications, there is a sound, if limited,
economic case for the use of criminal penalties to deter some copyright
infringement. Civil sanctions alone appear ineffective at deterring some socially
harmful copying. In response, copyright owners will increasingly turn to DRM to
combat this behavior. But while DRM can be used to prevent socially harmful
copying, it will also tend to limit socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works. If
criminal sanctions can deter harmful conduct that would not have been deterred
by civil sanctions alone, copyright owners should be willing (or compelled) to
forego DRM, thereby decreasing the costs of valuable behavior. The chief
economic rationale for criminal copyright law is not that it will allow copyright
holders to capture more rents, but rather the expectation that deterring some
harmful copying will generate more beneficial behavior.
D. What Kind of Criminal Liability Could be Desirable?
Part II.C made the theoretical case for using criminal sanctions to deter
copyright infringement. We believe that some kind of criminal copyright liability
may be economically justified. In this section, we describe the nature of the
criminal sanctions that are mostly likely to be beneficial. The use of criminal
sanctions to deter copyright infringement offers significant benefits but also
considerable costs. As with most such projects, accurately estimating the costs
and benefits is difficult. This is especially true given the empirical uncertainty
surrounding some of the most important issues. In the face of this uncertainty, the
use of criminal sanctions for copyright violation should be narrowly
circumscribed and limited to situations that are likely to produce the highest
benefits at the lowest costs.
Criminal liability is especially important with respect to individual or
poorly capitalized infringers of large quantities of copyrighted material who are
difficult to detect and identify. Accordingly, criminal liability should focus on
these situations. It would certainly be objectionable to disproportionately
prosecute and imprison poor offenders. Yet focusing prosecutorial effort on those
acts of infringement which are the most costly and most difficult to detect makes
economic sense. Additionally, infringement prosecutions should address large
scale counterfeiting operations that market bootlegged music, movies, and
software. These behaviors likely cause the most social harm, and these are the
violators for whom criminal liability will pack the most deterrent punch.
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Imposing criminal liability risks chilling valuable conduct, so criminal
sanctions should be reserved for behavior that is most clearly harmful. This is the
case for exact duplication of copyrighted works that will directly substitute for
legitimately available copies. Although copyright law gives authors the exclusive
right to make derivative works and substantially similar copies of their works, a
great deal of behavior that falls into these categories also could constitute fair
use. 124 By contrast, there will be an extremely limited number of situations when
exact duplication of copyrighted works can constitute fair use. By confining
criminal liability to the latter cases, the risks of chilling socially valuable behavior
can be minimized.
These risks can be further minimized by including a strict mens rea
requirement for criminal liability. Mens rea standards can be helpful in
distinguishing harmful from valuable conduct. Accordingly, criminal copyright
infringement should condition liability on proof that the defendant intentionally
violated a known copyright. That is, the prosecution should have to prove that the
defendant knew that the infringed works were protected by copyright and that he
knew that his conduct was unlawful. Good faith belief that his behavior was not
copyright infringement or constituted fair use should preclude criminal liability.
Finally, in order to further guard against deterring socially valuable
behavior, the DMCA should be amended to clearly exempt defendants from
liability when their circumvention of technological protective measures is done
for purposes of fair use or to obtain access to content that is not protected by
copyright. 125 In theory, perfect enforcement of copyright law would eliminate the
need for technological protections, but perfect enforcement is not possible in
practice and, given the cost of achieving it, is not warranted. Thus, the use of
DRM can help prevent harmful copyright violations, but users who circumvent it
for valuable reasons should not be subject to liability.
E. Assessing Current U.S. Criminal Copyright Law
Having made the limited and tentative economic case for criminal
sanctions for some copyright infringement, it remains to assess the extent to
which current U.S. law conforms to our judgments. For the most part, it matches
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our prescriptions fairly well. The provisions of criminal copyright law and the
enforcement efforts of the Department of Justice generally comport with our
analysis of when such liability is appropriate. We do have some concerns about
the monetary thresholds for criminal liability, however.
1. Current Criminal Copyright Law
U.S. copyright law provides for the use of criminal sanctions to deter
copyright infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 506. The law provides for punishment of
any person “who willfully infringes a copyright…if the infringement was
committed (A) for purposed of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
[or] (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during
any 180-day period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.” 126 Thus,
to be found liable, a defendant must be shown to have acted willfully and to have
been motivated by commercial advantage or to have met the damages threshold
established in the second provision of the statute.
The mens rea requirement of willfulness is helpful in limiting the potential
for chilling valuable copying behavior. Courts have generally interpreted this
requirement to require proof of a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty. 127 This typically means that the defendant subjectively knew that the
infringed works were subject to copyright and that his conduct was unlawful.
Merely intending to copy is insufficient. Given this fairly strict requirement, it is
unlikely that the existence of criminal sanctions will deter fair use.
We are less confident that the thresholds for criminal liability in
subsections (A) and (B) are sufficient to limit criminal liability to those cases
when it is most effective. The requirement in (A) that the defendant be motivated
by commercial gain or profit covers much conduct where civil liability would be
sufficient. Selling a copy of a CD to a friend for $10 would meet the requirement,
but there is no reason to think that the apparatus of the criminal law is necessary
to deter this behavior. Even with the low likelihood of detection, the harm it
causes is slight.
Subsection (B)’s requirement, which was added by the No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act of 1997, removes the necessity of proving the defendant’s
motive, but it does add a monetary threshold. It is difficult to predict whether
$1000 is the appropriate place to set this limit. The answer will turn on the
probability of detection and the availability of a damages multiplier in civil suits.
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If a defendant willfully infringes $1,000 worth of copyrighted works, he may be
liable for statutory damages of up to $30,000 per infringed work and up to
$150,000 in enhanced damages for willfulness. 128 If the total civil damages
award for the $1,000 infringement is $200,000, then a rational person will only be
deterred from infringing if the probability of detection is at least 0.005 (one-half
of one percent). If the damages multipliers cannot be constitutionally raised to
reflect likelihoods of detection that are lower than this, the $1,000 threshold may
be set close to the optimal value. In addition, defendants who cannot pay such
large judgments also might not be deterred by civil fines, in which case criminal
penalties could be necessary.
The penalties for criminal copyright infringement are specified in 18
U.S.C. § 2319. Defendants found guilty under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (the
commercial gain or profit subsection) are subject to imprisonment for not more
than five years if they reproduce or distribute at least ten copies of one or more
works with a total retail value of more than $2,500 in any 180-day period. 129 The
maximum prison term doubles upon subsequent convictions. 130 For defendants
found guilty under subsection (B) (the monetary threshold section), the maximum
prison term is three years for a first offense and six years for subsequent
offenses. 131
In addition, some courts have been willing to employ computer use
restrictions and other alternative sanctions as conditions of probation and
supervised release. One defendant was subjected to three years of probation
during which he “shall maintain a daily log of all addresses he accesses via any
personal computer or other computer used by him, other than for authorized
employment, and he shall make this log available to the Probation Officer.”
Additionally, “the defendant shall refrain from accessing, via a computer, any
‘material’ that relates to the activity in which he was engaged while committing
the instant offense, namely, [Internet Relay Chat] channels; e-mail and instant
messaging that relate to warez activities; and any internet warez related web sites,
channels, and private sites.” 132 Although monitoring these sanctions may be
difficult, that is always the case with probation and supervised released. If they
are backed with the threat of a return to prison, they may nonetheless be
successful even if they are not perfectly enforced.
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As always, it is difficult to say whether the penalties imposed for
copyright infringement are well-balanced to maximize their deterrent benefit and
minimize social costs. Sending people to prison is very expensive. Moreover, as
we have argued elsewhere, longer terms of imprisonment may have diminished
deterrent capacity relative to their length and cost. 133 Given the high social cost
of imprisonment, terms exceeding a few years are probably not efficiently
deterring copyright infringement. The use of alternative sanctions such as
technological use limitations is worth exploring. 134 The threat of having limited
internet and cell phone access for five years may be sufficient to deter many
twenty-year-olds from engaging in large scale copyright infringement. And the
costs of imposing such sanctions are relatively low: only monitoring costs and the
productivity losses from limiting offenders’ use of communications technologies.
In addition, many copyright violators who are not motivated by economic gain,
especially those whose behavior is politically motivated, may be difficult or
impossible to deter with any size sanction. 135 Accordingly, alternative sanctions
that prevent them from engaging in violations in the first place may have valuable
incapacitative effects. Without access to technology that enables infringement,
these offenders will be less likely to cause harm. Although alternative sanctions
impinge upon offenders’ free speech rights, they are almost certainly less extreme
than the liberty losses associated with imprisonment. 136
2. Criminal IP Enforcement
Although the scope and magnitude of criminal penalties for copyright
infringement may be overbroad, the behavior of prosecutors and judges seems
generally consistent with efficient deterrence. The Department of Justice tends to
prosecute between 50 and 100 cases each year, 137 and the defendants are typically
those engaged in the kinds of conduct that is most appropriate for criminal
liability—large-scale counterfeiting that is difficult to detect. Most recently, for
example, the leaders of the internet piracy group “IMAGiNE” were convicted of
running “an organized online piracy ring that sought to become the premier group
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to first release Internet copies of movies only showing in theaters.” 138 The
defendants received sentences ranging from 23 to 60 months. 139 In another recent
case, the defendant was convicting of producing and selling thousands of
counterfeit music CDs and movie DVDs at flea markets in California. The
estimated retail value of the counterfeit goods was $2.6 million. The lead
defendant in the case received a four-year sentence. 140
These are the kinds of defendants against whom criminal liability will be
most valuable. 141 Their behavior is hard to detect and occurs on a large scale. If
they were subject only to civil liability, the magnitude of the damages awards
would almost certainly exceed their ability to pay. Moreover, their behavior—
counterfeiting music, movies, and software—is the kind that creates substantial
social harm and little, if any, social benefit. The fact that someone was convicted
138
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and sentenced for selling thousands of copies of bootlegged music is unlikely to
deter others who are engaged in conduct that is socially valuable.
*

*

*

This Part has analyzed the theoretical economic case for imposing
criminal sanctions on copyright infringers and found that criminal penalties may
be warranted to deter some behaviors that might otherwise go unchecked by civil
sanctions or DRM. The existence of criminal penalties for copyright infringement
could minimize copyright owners’ reliance on DRM thereby reducing the costs of
socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works. Deterring socially harmful copying
while promoting socially beneficial copying promotes overall welfare. As noted,
however, important questions about the precise effects of criminal liability remain
unanswered and unanswerable with current data.
III. CRIMINAL PATENT LAW?
Although we believe that there is a limited economic case for criminal
copyright sanctions, this does not automatically mean that the same is true for
patent law. The economics of patents and inventions are very different from those
of copyrights and creative works. Accordingly, this Part applies the economic
theory discussed in Part I to the unique issues that arise for patent law.
A.

The Economic Harm from Patent Infringement

In order to determine whether criminal sanctions would be economically
beneficial in patent law, we must first determine what (if any) economic harm is
caused when a firm or individual infringes a patent. There are two possible
sources of harm. The first is the reduction in the patent holder’s incentives to
commercialize, improve, or create the invention in the first place—that is, the
reduced incentives to innovate in light of the reduced returns to owning a
patent. 142 These costs are extremely difficult to calculate because they require
answering a hypothetical counterfactual: how much innovative work would the
patent-holding firm have done had they known that their patent rights would be
infringed by a competitor? This in turn implicates the question of how much
other firms will reduce their innovative efforts in the future if they have reason to
believe that their future patent rights will not be secure. As we did with copyright
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law, though, we will treat some forms of patent infringement as causing social
welfare losses. 143
The second potential source of harm from patent infringement lies with
the possibility of expensive self-help by the patent holder. What form might that
self-help take in the patent context? The kinds of technological measures that are
available for copyrighted works will generally not be available to prevent
unauthorized use of new inventions.
Innovators could, however, switch from
patents to trade secrets, thereby preventing unauthorized use of the invention by
refusing to share it publicly. 144 Inventors could try to limit others’ ability to
know essential aspects of an invention, giving them a competitive advantage. A
trade secret is the IP equivalent of building high walls around a piece of property.
(Some trade secrets are in fact protected by high walls.) Trade secrets are
privately costly because they require private expenditures to secure them; the
owner of a trade secret must expend resources protecting that secret via
technological measures (such as walls, both physical and electronic) and
nondisclosure agreements. 145 They may also be socially costly (compared with
patents) precisely because information surrounding the technological advance is
kept secret rather than shared with the public. 146 One of the principal benefits of
the patent system is the anticipated quid pro quo between inventors and the
public—in return for getting exclusive rights in their inventions, inventors must
disclose those inventions to the public who benefit from the opportunities for
further innovation. 147
We suspect, however, that the risk of firms electing trade secrets over
patents is relatively small, even in an environment in which patent infringement
goes under-deterred. Many inventions will simply be impossible to protect with
trade secrets. 148 When an invention is commercialized and sold, competitors will
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be able to reverse-engineer the product and reveal the innovation underlying it. 149
Reverse engineering is not prohibited by trade secret law, so competitors will
quickly gain access to the underlying invention. 150 This will be true for nearly all
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (whose chemical formulae are discernible
from the drugs themselves), medical devices, and machinery, as well as many
electronics, and semi-conductor inventions. Inventions of processes that can be
practiced behind closed doors, the fruits of which can then be sold without
revealing the secrets, may still be protectable as trade secrets. (Ironically,
business methods and software—the most commonly cited examples of bad
patents—may often fall into this category. 151) And certainly there will be some
inventions that are too complex or opaque to be successfully reverse-engineered.
But by and large, the types of innovations that are currently protected by patent
law will not be protectable by trade secrets.
Of course, the harm that patent infringement will do is only part of the
equation. Although the existence of meaningful harm is necessary in order
answer the threshold question of whether sanctions for infringement are
worthwhile, determining the appropriate level of those sanctions will require
understanding the value of the infringement to the infringer. Here, the story is
somewhat clearer. The benefit to an infringer from patent infringement is just the
profit that the infringer received from the infringement, over and above whatever
profit the infringer might have made had it sold a non-infringing product
instead. 152 This is similar to the inquiry that a court must conduct when
determining the “reasonable royalty” that an infringer must pay to a patent holder
that has prevailed in court. 153 For the most part, it depends upon the number of
sales that the infringer has made and the profits per sale. This inquiry can be
quite technically difficult, as it often involves answering a complicated counterfactual. 154 But it is at least conceptually straightforward, and a court will often be
able to compute the measure to within a reasonable approximation.
B.

Likelihood of Detection
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As we noted above, the deterrent power of sanctions and their appropriate
magnitude will depend on how often harmful behavior will be detected. How
likely is detection of patent infringement? Here it is useful to separate two types
of infringers: those who infringe accidentally and would prefer to negotiate
licenses, and those who infringe deliberately (and could more accurately be
characterized as engaging in theft). Patent owners will always have incentives to
search for possible infringers. Unintentional infringers—the first group—would
have similar incentives to search for patents that their products might infringe, in
order to secure licenses. 155 They would also have no incentives to attempt to hide
or disguise their products or to obscure the fact that those products are infringing.
These unintentional infringers are thus quite likely to be detected (at least
eventually) by patent owners.
For intentional infringers who do not wish to be caught, the picture is not
quite so clear. These parties will attempt to hide their infringement, and the onus
will be entirely upon patent holders to locate them. 156 This increases the search
burden placed upon patent holders, but does it mean that these infringers are
unlikely to be discovered? We suspect that the answer is generally no. Most
infringing products that are placed on the shelves and sold openly are quite likely
to be detected due to the strong incentives that patent holder have to police their
property rights. It is always possible that a domestic black market for innovative
goods could develop, much like the black market in pirated CDs and DVDs. (We
will discuss international markets below.) But no significant such market appears
to exist, and we think that is unsurprising for several reasons. First, the cost of
producing patented products is typically much higher than the cost of copying
copyrighted works. 157 Any individual with a computer and the right software can
produce burned DVD copies, but it would take a factory to make the computer
used to burn the DVD. The same holds true for semiconductors, biotechnology,
and the like. The second, related reason is that quality is much more at issue in
patented products than it is for copyrighted works. Partly because it is so easy to
produce pirated copyright works, and partly because they are so inexpensive,
purchasers do not typically worry about receiving a copy of unusable quality. But
this is not the case for drugs or electronics, for example, where obtaining a lowquality copy would be expensive and even potentially harmful. Accordingly,
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consumers will tend to opt for purchasing patentable goods from trusted sources,
not on the black market. 158
The greatest likelihood of infringement going undetected involves patents
on processes, including software patents, that can be performed behind closed
doors. Just as these processes are easiest to conceal, and thus lend themselves
most directly to the use of trade secrets, so too are they easiest to infringe in secret
without detection. 159 A patent holder could always study the products or services
being performed by a competitor and deduce that the competitor must be violating
its patent; or it could take a guess, file an action alleging infringement, and then
seek discovery that would reveal the competitor firm’s secret activities.
Accordingly, even secret infringing activity is by no means impossible to detect.
But there is at least a chance that it could go undetected for a meaningful length of
time. The result is symmetry between infringers’ and patent holders’ actions: it is
easier to infringe a process patent than a product patent without being detected,
and it is easier to use trade secrets to protect a process than to protect a product,
making innovators significantly more likely to opt out of the patent system and
into trade secret protection when their innovations take the form of processes.
This trend will be heightened when patent holders view infringement remedies as
inadequate. The case for criminal penalties for patent violations is thus strongest
with respect to process patents, particularly patents on inventions that could
conceivably be practiced in secret.
While we believe that infringing activities are generally likely to be
detected, findings of liability are another matter entirely. Federal district court
judges find patent law notoriously difficult, 160 and the Federal Circuit has itself
been widely criticized for issuing confusing decisions, promulgating ambiguous
doctrines, and simply deciding cases incorrectly. 161 One of us has separately
suggested that courts should award heightened damages to patent owners that
prevail at trial (and assess penalties against patent owners that fail) in order to
compensate parties for the risk that their cases will be decided incorrectly. 162 The
risk that an infringer will be discovered but not sanctioned is thus very real.
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But the risk may not be all that great. Even if patent courts are no better
than a coin flip, there is still a 50% chance that an infringer will be sanctioned.
That is much better odds than exist for most crimes, where criminals are caught
and sentenced to prison at a far lower rate. A 50% rate would require only that
damages be doubled, which is not insignificant but is again far lower than the
types of multiples typically contemplated for other crimes, including copyright
infringement. But we suspect that patent courts, for all of their flaws, are actually
better than a coin flip. This will decrease the necessary multiples accordingly. If,
for instance, patent courts are 75% accurate, then the necessary multiple would be
4/3, a relatively modest figure.
Of course, patent law awards heightened damages, but not to compensate
for the possibility that infringement will go undetected or unpunished. Rather,
judges in patent trials can award up to treble damages in cases of “willful”
infringement: those instances in which a party knowingly and deliberately
infringed a patent. 163 It should be clear from the preceding paragraphs that this
practice makes little sense from the perspective of optimal deterrence, at least on
its face. However, as we will explain below, there is one respect in which
enhanced damages for willful infringement tracks a rational economic theory of
sanctions for intellectual property violations.
C.

Judgment-Proof Patent Defendants?

The next issue is whether patent defendants would typically be able to pay
judgments levied against them if those judgments took the form of monetary
sanctions, or whether they would in a significant number of cases be insolvent or
judgment-proof. In section III.A, we noted that the benefit to an infringer from
infringing a patent is equal to the infringer’s profits from the sale or use of the
patented product. These profits could in theory be quite substantial: if a firm sold
a patented drug on the black market for a price just below the monopoly price, it
could earn tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Profits from the
infringement of less valuable inventions would likely be smaller but could still be
significant.
However, in section III.B we observed that patent infringement will
generally be easy to detect, with some notable but limited exceptions. Because
most infringement will be detected, it will not be necessary to substantially
increase the sanctions to account for the likelihood of non-detection in order to
achieve appropriate deterrence. There may have to be some multiplier to account
for the fact that “conviction” is never certain in a patent court. Nonetheless, the
163
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proper measure of sanctions for infringement will typically hover near the
measure of infringer profits. With rare exceptions, then, the overall sanction
should be at or near the level of profits earned by the infringer.
We believe that patent infringers will tend not to be judgment-proof and
will be able to afford this measure of damages. We reach this conclusion for two
reasons. First, as we noted above, manufacturing a patented product for sale is
often quite expensive. 164 A firm that wishes to sell computers, or smartphones, or
any other type of consumer electronics will require a factory of some sort to
assemble those computers, and even a pharmaceutical infringer will need a
significant operation to produce prescription drugs in any quantity. To be sure,
some inventions, such as software, can be duplicated with a minimum of capital
investment. 165 But the median patented product will require a far greater
investment of resources to produce in quantity than will the median copyrighted
DVD or CD. Accordingly, patent infringers will generally be larger, bettercapitalized operations with substantial resources that can be seized in order to pay
judgments. Against such firms, monetary damages will create adequate
deterrence.
Of course, there is always the possibility that an infringer will be a foreign
firm whose assets cannot be seized by American courts. To the extent that black
markets for patented products have developed, they have typically been foreignbased, for precisely this reason. 166 But if American courts cannot reach a firm’s
assets, they will not be able to reach the persons running those firms for purposes
of criminal penalties either. Thus, while deterrence may be an issue with regard
to infringers operating abroad, imposing criminal penalties in cases of patent
infringement will not ameliorate the problem.
The second and even more general reason that patent infringers will not be
judgment-proof is that they will have the profits they have earned from the
infringement available to them. Simple disgorgement of these profits should be
nearly adequate to deter firms from infringing a patent. Recall that this is not the
case in many instances of standard property crimes. In a typical property crime,
the property may be damaged or spoiled before it is recovered, or it may never be
recovered at all. 167 In addition, because property criminals are caught and
prosecuted at low rates, it is necessary to multiply the punishment imposed upon
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them many times in order to achieve adequate deterrence. 168 This means that
forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge the stolen property, by itself, cannot serve as an
adequate sanction. It is of course possible that patent infringers might “spoil” the
profits they have stolen by absconding with them or investing them in an asset
that has lost value. But this is much less of an issue with respect to monetary
profits that will often be recoverable as cash than it is with respect to stolen
property that might have been fenced, destroyed, or otherwise reduced in value.
By consequence, we believe it is quite likely that patent infringers will be able to
pay the monetary judgments against them, even when those judgments are large
enough to induce deterrence.
D.

Optimal Activity Levels and Incapacitation

Before we can reach any final conclusions regarding the propriety of
criminal sanctions for patent infringement, there are two other questions we must
consider. The first is the optimal level of patent infringement: should there be
zero infringement, or more than zero? Of course, in a utopian world there would
in fact be zero patent infringement, but the question is whether the level of
precaution necessary to bring that about would be more or less socially costly
than the harm of infringement itself. Put another way, the question is: how close
is patent infringement to socially valuable conduct? Returning to the explanation
we offered in Part I, it would be extremely costly if every person were to drive his
or her car so carefully that no automobile accidents ever occurred. Because
driving is (typically) a socially valuable activity that should be allowed to take
place, society tolerates some number of accidents in order to enable individuals to
drive without having to bear the costs of excessively costly precautions. On the
other hand, intentional murder bears no resemblance to any socially useful
activity, and thus there is no precaution too costly. The optimal rate of murder is
zero, even accounting for the costs of precautions, and that is why the penalty for
murder is infinite or close to infinite—the death penalty or life in prison—in
many jurisdictions.
It should be clear from this brief exposition that the socially optimal level
of patent infringement is well above zero. Engaging in innovative research and
development is immensely valuable, and it would be tremendously costly for
inventors to take the precautions necessary to ensure that they are never violating
an existing patent. 169 Merely searching through the existing stores of patents is an
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immensely costly endeavor; determining what technologies those patents actually
cover is even costlier. 170 Demanding that a firm never infringe a patent would
almost certainly mean asking that firm to cease operations entirely. 171
The case for tolerating some instances of patent infringement may be even
stronger than it is for automobile accidents. Conduct that presses against the line
between permissible and impermissible may be socially productive in the patent
context, where it is generally not in others. Consider efforts to “engineer around”
a patent. When a firm understands the boundaries of a patent and tries to evade
that patent by developing a process or product that does not infringe it, sometimes
it is merely trying to deny another patent holder its due rewards. But much of the
time the research and development that go into engineering around a patent are
highly socially valuable and result in a superior alternative to the patented
invention. 172 In the course of engineering around, a firm might discover a
cheaper or more efficient way to produce a good or process, or it might hit upon
an improvement to the invention that carries additional benefits. This is activity
that society should encourage, not ban. More generally, much of patent
infringement is inadvertent and occurs in the course of otherwise productive
activity. It would be inappropriate to increase the penalties for infringement to a
level at which they would discourage these types of innovative activities. Unlike
crimes like murder, there is generally no case for assessing penalties for
infringement beyond the minimum needed to ensure deterrence.
It might appear to some observers that willful infringement describes a
category of cases for which the optimal activity level is conceivably zero.
Perhaps, they might argue, there is no reason infringers who know that they are
using another party’s intellectual property should be allowed to do so without
licensing it. 173 The patent owners are being deprived of the just rewards for their
inventions, and the infringers are not engaging in any useful research and
development of their own. Damages for such an activity should be set at an
extremely high level, or perhaps criminal penalties should even be imposed.
According to this line of argument, patent law is right to impose heightened
damages in precisely these cases.
Yet we do not believe the story is so simple. First, many cases of willful
infringement start out as non-willful infringement and only transform into willful
170
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infringement when the patent owner notifies the infringer of the existence of the
patent. 174 In these “mixed” cases only the part of the infringement that occurred
after the infringer gained notice of the infringement should count as willful, and
often this is the minority of the activity. Second, in many cases an infringer will
have attempted to obtain a license from the patent owner but failed. Bargaining
breakdowns in bilateral monopoly situations are common and well-understood.
The patent owner may also be making unreasonable demands or be in a position
to hold up the infringer for significant rents. Under these circumstances, one
cannot say that the optimal level of infringement is zero: the concessions by an
infringer necessary to negotiate a license in every case may well be more socially
costly than the infringement itself, particularly when the patent owner has the
right to seek an injunction to halt the infringing conduct entirely. 175 That is, it
may be more socially costly for the infringer to either cease activity entirely or
pay the patent holder’s ransom than it is for the infringement to have taken place.
That is not to say that patent holders should not be compensated for willful
(or any other type of) infringement. A thief is not entitled to steal a car just
because the owner of the car refuses to sell it for the thief’s price. But it is to say
that even willful infringement can occur under circumstances in which it could be
very costly to prevent. Accordingly, the case for even greater damages—beyond
what is necessary for standard deterrence—is weak even with respect to willful
infringement.
The final question is whether individuals who infringe patents should be
incapacitated—that is, whether they should be actively prevented from
committing further acts of infringement, rather than deterred. 176 This question
relates to the preceding discussion because it raises the issue of whether
infringement can ever resemble a socially productive activity, or whether it is
purely harmful. If we believe that infringers merely create social costs, and we
believe that an individual who has infringed once is likely to do so again, then
174
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there is an argument for using incapacitation. Better directly to block the person
from engaging in future acts of infringement than to rely upon deterrence—which
failed once—to accomplish the same task.
As the foregoing paragraphs should make clear, we do not believe that this
is an accurate depiction of infringing activities. Individuals who infringe once are
not necessarily likely to do so again. The infringement might have been based
upon a mistake or a lack of information. 177 Or it might have been the result of
innovative activity, activity that generally should not be quashed. The individuals
involved in the infringement might also be especially talented, innovative, or
productive members of society, the types of individuals whom it would be most
costly to incarcerate. At some level this is an empirical question about which we
can only offer an educated guess—it might be that there are serial patent
infringers who seem to have no regard for others’ intellectual property rights. But
we suspect that infringement is typically a byproduct of normal innovative and
commercial activities, and if this is the case then incarceration would be too heavy
a cudgel to employ.
Moreover, even if we are entirely wrong about this analysis, there are less
costly ways to prevent an individual from infringing in the future than
incarcerating that person. Depending on the individual’s prior activities, she
could be barred from serving as an officer or director of a corporation, or even
prevented from working in a particular technological field. This is analogous to
the sanction of taking away an individual’s computer that we discussed in Part II.
Such a measure would no doubt be costly, but not nearly so costly as actually
locking the individual behind bars. It should serve only as an absolute last step—
but that means that prison need not be any type of step at all.
*

*

*

Because the benefit to a patent infringer is capped at the measure of
profits, because patent infringement is likely to be detected, and because the vast
majority of infringers will be capitalized firms that have access to the profits they
have just reaped from the infringement, the case for criminal sanctions for patent
infringement is especially weak. Arguments regarding activity levels or the need
for incapacitation have no greater purchase. Accordingly, we believe it is
appropriate from an economic perspective that American law imposes no criminal
penalties for any acts related to patent infringement. 178 The only area in which
we feel that criminal penalties might conceivably be desirable involves secret
infringement of patented processes. Even here, where detection is much less
177
178
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certain, criminal penalties should be used extremely sparingly, if at all. The
economic structure of patents, and the economic realities of innovation and
commercialization, provide superior alternatives.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and stakeholders have been wrong to assume that criminal
sanctions for IP infringement are justified on economic grounds. It is true that
criminal sanctions could play an important role in preventing harmful behavior
that cannot be deterred through other means. But imposing criminal sanctions is
costly. For patent infringement, the costs of imposing criminal sanctions are very
unlikely to exceed its benefits. Civil sanctions will probably be sufficient for
creating the optimal amount of infringing behavior. For copyright infringement,
civil sanctions alone should be sufficient to deter nearly all types of harmful
conduct. There is an economic case for imposing criminal sanctions for copyright
infringement only with respect to a discrete set of activities: massive reproduction
and sales of commercially valuable works. We have arrived at the conclusion that
the case for criminal IP sanctions is weak or non-existent while putting to one side
both non-economic considerations, such as moral or deontological objections to
criminal IP sanctions, and economic concerns about the efficacy of IP in
promoting innovation. Once those considerations are added to the calculus, we
suspect that the argument for criminal sanctions for IP infringement will
disintegrate almost entirely.
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